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Challenges of WTO Appellate Body and China’s Solutions in Perspective of Belt and Road Initiative
Current Issue
Volume 7, 2019
Issue 2 (June)
Pages: 10-16   |   Vol. 7, No. 2, June 2019   |   Follow on         
Paper in PDF Downloads: 99   Since Oct. 29, 2019 Views: 1100   Since Oct. 29, 2019
Authors
[1]
Yuntao Pu, Institute of International Law, Wuhan University, Wuhan, China.
Abstract
America’s blocking of appointment of World Trade Organization (hereinafter “WTO”) appellate body members is not conducted in good faith. WTO dispute resolution mechanism is experiencing tough period, but have bright future with its spirit of rule-of-law and multilateralism. Voting procedure could be launched to resolve the impasse according to rules of WTO, but lack of experience and political concerns constitute obstacles. Apart from compulsory dispute resolutions, conciliation and arbitration should not be neglected. Professional conciliation committee ought to be established, and more attention ought to be paid on procedural issues of trade disputes arbitration. From China’s perspective, it is necessary to have more direct resolutions in its proposals for appointment of WTO appellate body members. Under Belt and Road Initiative, the dispute resolution centre instituted by China should be the outcome of cooperation between China and foreign famous institutions, based on the reputation of foreign arbitration institutions and characters of Belt and Road Initiative. The centre aims at sustaining multilateralism and rule-of-law principle, instead of replacing WTO dispute settlement body.
Keywords
WTO Dispute Resolution Mechanism, WTO Appellate Body, Voting Procedure, Conciliation, Arbitration, Belt and Road Initiative
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